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Since 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual has
1
dominated criminal sentencing practice in the federal courts.
2
Revised regularly, the Manual provides base offense levels,
aggravating and mitigating factors, and a range of sentences for a
3
sentencing judge to consider. Because of the slow pace of the
judicial system, defendants sometimes commit their crimes while
one Manual is in effect, but are not sentenced until after a new
4
Manual is issued. When the new Guidelines increase the range of
5
punishments, potential ex post facto problems arise.
United States v. Booker famously excised the mandatory
provisions of the statute authorizing the Guidelines, thereby
6
making the Guidelines “effectively advisory.”
Judges are still
required to calculate the applicable Guidelines range, however,
and will rarely be overturned if they impose a within-Guidelines
7
sentence. The question thus arises: if the Guidelines are not
formally mandatory, but remain the de facto basis for sentencing,
8
does use of post-crime Guidelines violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?
A circuit split on this issue has developed; the Seventh Circuit has
9
authorized the use of post-crime Guidelines, while the D.C. Circuit
10
held that such use can violate the ex post facto prohibition.
Because the Guidelines are a critical and ever-present part of
federal criminal practice, the resolution of this issue will have wideranging implications.
1. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.1.2, A.1.5,
introductory cmt. (2009) (stating that the first guidelines “took effect on
November 1, 1987, and apply to all offenses committed on or after that date”); see
also id. ch.1, pt. A.1.5, introductory cmt. (2009) (noting that the guidelines
encompass more than ninety percent of felony and Class A misdemeanor federal
cases).
2. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.4(b), introductory cmt. (2009); see id. ch. 1, pt. A.1.2
(noting that the commission has authority to submit guideline amendments to
Congress each year).
3. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.4(g), introductory cmt. (2009) (discussing the Sentencing
Commission’s process for determining appropriate sentencing ranges).
4. See Christine M. Zeivel, Note and Comment, Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive
Application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 395, 397–98 (2008)
(describing a hypothetical sentencing scenario with ex post facto implications).
5. Id.
6. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
7. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
8. “Post-crime Guidelines,” as used in this article, means Sentencing
Guidelines that take effect after the crime for which the defendant is being
sentenced.
9. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006).
10. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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This article addresses the arguments for each side, considers
both the legal standards and empirical evidence, and ultimately
argues that use of post-crime Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Part I begins by providing a short primer on
Guidelines sentencing and an example of the ex post facto
11
problem. Part II considers ex post facto jurisprudence, particularly
as developed in cases analyzing and measuring the use (or non-use)
of discretion. Part III then examines the intersection of the
Guidelines and ex post facto jurisprudence, outlining the facts and
holdings of the relatively few cases that have considered this issue.
Finally, using recent data demonstrating how the Guidelines are
applied in practice, Part IV argues that the use of post-crime
Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it does
not significantly increase the likelihood of a harsher sentence,
either as a legal matter or as an empirical one.
I.

GUIDELINES SENTENCING AND BOOKER
12

A. Structure and History of the Sentencing Guidelines

The Sentencing Guidelines Manual is produced and regularly
revised by the United States Sentencing Commission, which is
composed of seven voting members (at least three of whom are
13
The
federal judges) and two nonvoting ex officio members.
Sentencing Commission continually refines the Guidelines,
increasing and (less often) decreasing base offense levels, adding
or (less often) removing aggravating and mitigating factors, and
14
creating new guidelines to reflect new criminal laws.
The Guidelines and their amendments are both descriptive
and prescriptive: the Commission seeks to reflect actual sentencing
practice, but also alters the Guidelines to comply with
15
congressionally-mandated directives and new laws. The proposed
11. See discussion infra Part I.
12. It is assumed the reader is familiar with the basics of calculating sentences
using the Guidelines. For additional background, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. B (2009).
13. See id. ch. 1, pt. A.1.1.
14. See id. ch. 1, pt. 2 (describing the process by which the United States
Sentencing Commission refines the guidelines).
15. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“[The Guidelines are]
the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from
the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”); id. at 46 n.2
(“Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence. For
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amendments are released on or before the first day of May of each
16
year; the revised Guidelines Manual then automatically goes into
effect the first day of November, unless Congress affirmatively
17
rejects it.
These annual changes lead to the ex post facto problem. As an
example, consider a defendant convicted of illegal possession of
hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance. Under the 2008
Guidelines, trafficking 700,000 units of hydrocodone would
18
19
constitute a base offense level of 20; using the 2009 Guidelines,
20
that same offense would receive a base level of 30. Assuming no
criminal history and no aggravating or mitigating factors, the 2008
21
Guidelines suggest a sentence of 33 to 41 months, while the 2009
22
Guidelines provide a suggested sentence of 97 to 121 months,
three times as much as the prior range.
When developing the Guidelines system, Congress,
“[a]lthough aware of possible ex post facto clause challenges to
application of the guidelines in effect at the time of
sentencing[,] . . . did not believe that the Ex Post Facto Clause would
23
apply to amended sentencing guidelines.”
The Sentencing
Commission concurred with this belief and initially did not address
24
the issue. Despite these expectations, every court of appeals held
that the use of post-crime mandatory Guidelines would violate the
25
Ex Post Facto Clause. The Supreme Court likewise held that similar
example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach
when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the
Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress
established for such crimes.”).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2009) (“The Commission, at or after the
beginning of a regular session of Congress, but not later than the first day of May,
may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section and submit to Congress
amendments to the guidelines . . . .”). The Commission also has the authority to
issue “Emergency Guidelines,” which do not necessarily comply with the standard
schedule. See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 101 Stat. 1266.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2009). Congress has exercised this authority only
once, to reject proposed changes to the crack cocaine sentencing scheme. See Act
of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334.
18. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(10) (2008).
19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2009).
20. See id.
21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2008).
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2009).
23. Id. § 1B1.11(a), cmt. background (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 77–78
(1983)).
24. Id.
25. See Zeivel, supra note 4, at 405, n.70.
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26

mandatory state guidelines violated the clause.
Bowing to the courts’ interpretation, the Commission added
language to the Guidelines instructing courts to “use the
Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is
sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines
Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution,”
in which case “the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect
27
on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.”
Because every federal court had already concluded that the
application of the post-crime Guidelines would violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause, district courts routinely used the time-of-crime
Guidelines Manual.
B. Booker Changes the Game
The rationale for this practice—that mandatory Guidelines are
functionally “laws” and thus subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause—was
undercut in 2005 with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
28
v. Booker. The “remedial” portion of Booker famously rendered the
Guidelines “effectively advisory” by excising the portions of the
29
statute making them mandatory. District courts were instructed to
consider the Guidelines as only one of the several sentencing
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and appellate courts were told
30
to review sentencing decisions for “reasonableness.”
Justice Scalia, in dissent, wondered whether a reasonableness
review would
preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging
district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines
ranges. . . . [W]ill it be a mere formality, used by busy
appellate judges only to ensure that busy district judges
say all the right things when they explain how they have
31
exercised their newly restored discretion?
26. See generally Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). Miller is discussed in
detail infra Part II.B.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11(a)–(b)(1)(1992).
28. 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding in part that mandatory sentencing
guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment).
29. Id. at 245.
30. Id. at 224, 245.
31. Id. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]ime may
tell” the effects of Booker’s remedial opinion, and, as argued infra Part IV.B, it has.
Id.
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Courts of appeal struggled to answer such questions, taking
varying approaches to the weight to give sentences that fell within
the Guidelines and those that were outside the recommended
range. The Supreme Court has thus had to revisit and clarify the
holding in Booker in several subsequent cases.
Rita v. United States held that appellate courts may consider a
32
within-Guidelines sentence presumptively reasonable, because
by the time an appeals court is considering a withinGuidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge
and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the
particular case. That double determination significantly
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable
33
one.
34
35
Gall v. United States, issued just a few months after Rita,
emphasized that “the Guidelines are only one of the factors to
36
consider when imposing sentence,” and that, while appellate
courts may apply a presumption of reasonableness to within37
Guideline sentences, district courts may not. Gall also clarified
that no court may presume that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence
38
is unreasonable.
39
Kimbrough v. United States, issued the same day as Gall,
continued the Court’s emphasis on discretion, holding that district
courts may (at least in cocaine cases) impose sentences outside the
Guidelines based on no more than a policy disagreement with the
40
Commission. Two years later, Spears v. United States demonstrated
41
the increasingly exasperated feeling on the Court, as the per
curiam decision strongly chastised lower court interpretations of
Kimbrough, writing that “[i]f the error of [the lower court] opinions

32. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
33. Id. at 347.
34. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
35. The Court issued Rita on June 21, 2007, and Gall on December 10, 2007.
36. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59.
37. Id. at 51.
38. Id. at 51.
39. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
40. Id. at 91.
41. 129 S. Ct. 840, 845 (2009) (per curiam). “The dissent says that ‘Apprendi,
Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough have given the lower courts a good deal to digest
over a relatively short period.’ True enough—and we should therefore promptly
remove from the menu the Eighth Circuit’s offering, a smuggled-in dish that is
indigestible.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
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is, as we think, evident, they demonstrate the need to clarify at once
42
the
holding
of Kimbrough.”

II. EX POST FACTO CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. History and Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution explicitly forbids ex post
facto legislation, stating that “[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
43
Law shall be passed.” This bare assertion, with no definition or
further guidance, leaves substantial room for interpretation.
However, “[a]lthough the text of the Ex Post Facto Clause is not selfexplanatory, its basic coverage has been well understood at least
44
since 1798,” when Justice Chase outlined four types of ex post facto
laws in Calder v. Bull:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment,
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the
45
offender.

42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Section 10 further prohibits states from
passing ex post facto legislation, one of the few restrictions on the states in the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The two clauses are interpreted in pari
materia and the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine in cases arising from
both state and federal courts. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610 (2003)
(discussing the “Constitution’s two Ex Post Facto Clauses” in tandem) (arising out
of state court); Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833) (arising out of federal
court).
44. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 515 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
45. 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
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The Supreme Court continues to rely on this definition in
46
modern cases, thereby mitigating at least some of the clause’s
ambiguity.
The purpose of the clause, according to the Court, is twofold.
First, it is designed “to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning
of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until
47
explicitly changed.” Second, it seeks to “restrain[] arbitrary and
48
potentially vindictive legislation.” It does not, however, protect
49
“an individual’s right to less punishment,” and “should not be
employed for ‘the micromanagement of an endless array of
50
legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures.’”
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, the clause was not
designed to “enable criminals to calculate with precision the
51
punishments that might be imposed on them,” for doing so would
“be both remote from the concerns that animate the ex post facto
52
clause and infeasible.”
The four categories established in Calder are strictly
interpreted. “[T]he focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on
whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of
‘disadvantage’ . . . but on whether any such change alters the
definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a
53
crime is punishable.” The Supreme Court has explicitly refused
to accept the argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause “forbids any
46. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (“Our understanding of
what is meant by ex post facto largely derives from the case of Calder v. Bull.”).;
William P. Ferranti, Comment, Revised Sentencing Guidelines and the Ex Post Facto
Clause, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2003) (“These categories are authoritative
and reiterated as a matter of course in most ex post facto decisions.”).
47. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981) (citing Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282, 298 (1977); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 229 (1883), overruled by
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (1798)).
48. Id. at 29 (citations omitted). See also Calder, 3 U.S. at 389 (Chase, J.).
With very few exceptions, the advocates of [ex post facto laws in England] were
stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent
such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State
Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder; or any ex post
facto law.
49. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30.
50. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 252 (2000) (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508 (1995)).
51. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293–94 (1977); Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
802 F.2d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 1986)).
52. Id. at 793.
53. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n.3 (internal citation omitted).
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legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a
54
Minor changes “might create some
prisoner’s punishment.”
speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a prisoner’s actual term of
confinement by making it more difficult for him to make a
persuasive case for early release, but that fact alone cannot end the
55
matter for ex post facto purposes.”
Determining the required
quantum of change has thus been the subject of several cases
before the courts; laws permitting discretion further complicate the
analysis.
B. Discretion and the Ex Post Facto Clause
The interaction between the Ex Post Facto Clause and
discretionary decisions has received significant attention from the
56
Court. A key case in this regard is Lindsey v. Washington, which
considered the effect of a statute removing sentencing judges’
discretion for certain crimes. The petitioners in Lindsey were
convicted of grand larceny; at the time of their crime, the relevant
sentencing statute permitted the judge to impose a sentence of
57
At the time of
anywhere from zero to fifteen years in prison.
sentencing, however, a new law directed that “the court . . . shall fix
58
the maximum term of such person’s sentence only,” thus
eliminating the judge’s discretion and requiring imposition of a
fifteen-year sentence.
The Supreme Court held that this
elimination of discretion constituted an ex post facto violation
because “the standard of punishment adopted by the new statute is
more onerous than that of the old. . . . It is plainly to the
59
substantial disadvantage of petitioners . . . .” Thus, even though
the judge could have sentenced petitioners to the sentence they
ultimately received, his inability to sentence them to less time
violated the prohibition on ex post facto legislation.
The Court addressed more subtle limits on judicial discretion
60
in Miller v. Florida, a case involving sentencing guidelines
remarkably similar to the pre-Booker federal system. The Florida
guidelines at issue in Miller were functionally mandatory; the state
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 508–09.
301 U.S. 397 (1937).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 398 (quoting 1935 Wash. Sess. Laws 308) (omissions in original).
Id. at 401–02.
482 U.S. 423 (1987).
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rule provided that “[d]epartures from the presumptive sentence
should be avoided unless there are clear and convincing reasons to
warrant aggravating or mitigating the sentence. Any sentence
outside of the guidelines must be accompanied by a written
61
statement delineating the reasons for the departure.”
Unlike
sentences outside the guideline range, within-guidelines sentences
62
were not subject to appellate review.
Therefore, the Court noted, “even if the revised guidelines law
did not ‘technically . . . increase . . . the punishment annexed to
[petitioner’s] crime,’ . . . it foreclosed his ability to challenge the
imposition of a sentence longer than the presumptive sentence
63
under the old law.”
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
O’Connor distinguished previous parole guideline cases, noting
that the Florida guidelines did not “simply provide flexible
‘guideposts’ for use in the exercise of discretion: instead, they
create a high hurdle that must be cleared before discretion can be
64
Thus, while judges retained discretion, the Court
exercised.”
believed that they were highly unlikely to exercise it; actual practice
overcame the formal rule.
A few years later, in California Department of Corrections v.
65
Morales, the Court adopted the same fact-based approach, but
reached the opposite conclusion. Morales considered a change to
the rules of the California Board of Prison Terms that allowed the
Board to delay parole rehearings for certain prisoners for up to
three years, if the Board, in its discretion, believed that it was “not
reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing
66
during the following years.” The rule replaced the one in effect at
the time of Morales’s crime, which provided for parole hearings on
67
an annual basis. Importantly, a parole hearing did not guarantee
release; it merely provided the Board the discretion to grant or

61. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(11) (1982) (amended 1993), quoted in Miller, 482
U.S. at 426.
62. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1983) (repealed 1997), quoted in Miller, 482 U.S.
at 426. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.001 (West 2006).
63. Miller, 482 U.S. at 433 (quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401
(1937) (omissions and bracket in original)).
64. Id. at 435.
65. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
66. Id. at 503 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)
(amended 1994)).
67. Id.
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68

deny parole.
Morales argued that application of the new rule
constituted an ex post facto violation because, by making parole
hearings less accessible, the rule increased the length of his
69
sentence. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that because “the
state has denied Morales opportunities for parole that existed
under prior law, [it made] the punishment for his crime greater
than it was under the law in effect at the time his crime was
70
committed.”
The Supreme Court reversed and held that, “[i]n light of the
particularized findings required under the amendment and the
broad discretion given to the Board, the narrow class of prisoners
covered by the amendment cannot reasonably expect that their
prospects for early release on parole would be enhanced by the
71
opportunity of annual hearings.”
The Court also noted that a
contrary holding would mean that “any legislative change that has
any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punishment” would be
72
a violation of the clause.
Embracing such a principle “would
require that we invalidate any of a number of minor . . . mechanical
changes that might produce some remote risk of impact on a
73
prisoner’s expected term of confinement.”
Because the
California rule created “only the most speculative and attenuated
possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the
74
measure of punishment,” the Court rejected Morales’s claims.
Morales distinguished prior cases by arguing that, “[i]n contrast
to the laws at issue in Lindsey . . . and Miller (which had the purpose
and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms . . . ),”
the Amendment only applied to “prisoners who have no reasonable
75
chance of being released.”
That is, while the Board formally
retained discretion to grant parole, it was highly unlikely to do so.
The unifying factor of Lindsey, Miller, and Morales is the Court’s
view of how discretion is used in practice. When the sentencing
judge has no discretion to impose a lesser sentence (as in Lindsey)
or discretion that can only be exercised by passing over a “high
hurdle” (Miller), the Court finds an ex post facto violation. When,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 504.
Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 16 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 1994).
Morales, 514 U.S. at 512.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 507.
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alternatively, favorable (to the defendant) discretion is unlikely,
even if formally available, no violation is present (Morales).
Interestingly, in none of these cases did the Court consider
empirical evidence, opting instead for its own perception of likely
practice.
Determining the appropriate line separating sufficient use of
discretion from formally-available-but-unlikely-in-practice discretion
76
is difficult. The Court’s initial decisions were obtuse on this point.
Morales noted vaguely that the Court has “long held that the
question of what legislative adjustments ‘will be held to be of
sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition’ must
77
be a matter of ‘degree.’” The appropriate standard, it indicated,
is “whether [the new law] produces a sufficient risk of increasing
78
the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” The
meaning of “sufficient” is thus critical, though the Court explicitly
refused to “articulate a single ‘formula’ for identifying those
legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive
crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional
79
prohibition.”
It did hold, however, that “speculative and
attenuated” and other “such conjectural effects are insufficient
under any threshold we might establish under the Ex Post Facto
80
Clause.”
81
Five years after Morales, in Garner v. Jones, the Court provided
82
greater specificity, making the standard one of “significant risk.”
Garner, like Morales, involved the retrospective application of a rule
reducing the frequency of parole hearings, in this case from once
83
every three years to once every eight years. The Court held that
the rule change did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even
though the Parole Board issued statements “indicating that its
76. Cf. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000) (“Whether retroactive
application of a particular change in parole law respects the prohibition on ex post
facto legislation is often a question of particular difficulty when the discretion
vested in a parole board is taken into account.”).
77. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171
(1925)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
82. Id. at 251. Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissent characterized the issue as
a “‘sufficient’ or substantial” risk. Id. at 260–61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). None of the opinions explicated the import, if any, of this distinction.
83. Id. at 255.
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policies were intended to increase time served in prison.”
To reach this result, Garner established a two-prong inquiry for
evaluating whether a change in policy “create[s] a significant risk of
85
increased punishment.”
First, the Court conducts a formal
analysis of the law to determine if, on its face, the law constitutes an
86
impermissible ex post facto law. Second, the Court looks to actual
87
practice and the “operation” of the law “as a matter of fact.” The
burden is placed on the defendant to make this showing: “When
the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk, the
respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s
practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising
discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer
88
period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.”
In applying this second prong, unlike its previous cases, the
Court took note of statistical data regarding the percentage of
89
inmates who were likely to face increased sentences. Though the
dissent warned that “[e]ighty percent were . . . at least potentially
90
negatively affected by the change,” the Court held that the
prisoner-respondent had not provided enough information to
indicate that the new rule “increase[d], to a significant degree, the
likelihood
or
probability
of
prolonging
respondent’s
91
incarceration.” Such “speculation” was insufficient to warrant ex
92
post facto protection.
The Court also noted that “where parole is concerned
discretion, by its very definition, is subject to changes in the
93
manner in which it is informed and then exercised.” That is, an
84. Id. at 261 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 257. See also James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of
Ex Post Facto Principles to the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v.
Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2008) (“Garner applied a two-tiered inquiry
into both the formal aspects of a legislative enactment and its empirically
demonstrable practical effects in order to determine whether the retroactive
application of the enactments is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause.”).
86. Garner, 529 U.S. at 249–52.
87. Id. at 256.
88. Id. at 255.
89. See id. at 251 (“‘[A]bout 90% of all prisoners are found unsuitable for
parole at the initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable at the second and
subsequent hearings.’” (quoting Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510–
11 (1995))).
90. Garner, 529 U.S. at 264 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 256.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 253.
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inmate’s expectation of any particular sentence is misplaced and,
absent evidence of formal or practical limits on discretion, the
inmate’s misplaced expectation does not give rise to an ex post facto
94
claim. The existence of such formal and practical barriers to the
exercise of discretion forms the heart of the post-crime Sentencing
Guidelines debate.
III. COMBINING BOOKER AND EX POST FACTO
Both the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, in factually
similar cases, have considered the use of post-crime Guidelines, but
they have reached opposite conclusions. This Part will consider
these two cases and note how their differing analytic focus led to
different results.
The Seventh Circuit, only a few months after the Supreme
Court issued Booker, addressed the use of post-crime Guidelines.
95
United States v. Demaree, authored by Judge Posner, considered a
defendant convicted of wire fraud based on acts committed in
96
2000; her sentencing was not held until 2004.
The 2000
Guidelines range was 18 to 24 months; under the 2004 version it
97
was 27 to 33 months. The district judge imposed a sentence of 30
months, but noted that if he had used the 2000 Guidelines, he
would have sentenced her to only 27 months, a 10% decrease
98
(though still above the range given in the 2000 Guidelines).
99
Demaree appealed and the Government confessed error. Despite
100
this, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence.
The Demaree court’s reasoning rested primarily on
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, tying Booker together
101
with the Court’s rulings on the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Demaree did
not formally adopt the two-prong approach of Garner, though it did
consider both the legal and practical limits on the sentencing
102
judge’s discretion. On the practical level, the court argued that a
94. Id. at 259.
95. 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006).
96. Id. at 792.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 792–93.
99. Id. at 793.
100. Id. at 795.
101. Id. at 793. The Court did not focus on additional problems created by the
retroactive application of Booker; this article will likewise consider only the
retroactive effects of the Guidelines. Id. at 795.
102. Id. at 795.
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sentencing judge could easily bypass a rule requiring him to ignore
the current Guidelines by simply indicating “not that he based his
sentence on [the new Guideline] but that he took the advice
implicit in it. A judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the
103
Sentencing Commission.”
Because district court judges should
not be expected to ignore the current Guidelines, formal
application of post-crime Guidelines poses no greater risk of an
increased sentence than application of the time-of-crime
104
Guidelines.
Demaree also rejected the parties’ argument that because
105
within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, judges
are unlikely to actually exercise their discretion and would instead
106
opt to avoid reversal by remaining within the Guideline range.
The court rejected this practical point by turning to formal, legal
107
analysis.
“All [a judge] has to do is consider the guidelines and
make sure that the sentence he gives is within the statutory range
and consistent with the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
108
3553(a).” So, while the Guidelines “nudge[]” the judge toward a
particular sentence, “his freedom to impose a reasonable sentence
109
outside the range is unfettered.” Accordingly, the court affirmed
110
Demaree’s sentence.
111
The D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Turner, reached the
opposite conclusion, largely on the basis of expectations about
112
actual practice.
Turner, like Demaree, arose in a white-collar
context; in 2001, Peter Turner forged a document in an attempt to
113
fraudulently cash in a life insurance policy. His sentencing range
according to the 2001 Guidelines was 21 to 27 months, but the
district court applied the then-current 2006 Guidelines, which

103. Id.
104. See id.
105. This proposition was settled in the Seventh Circuit at the time and later
approved by the Supreme Court in Rita. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2006).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 795.
109. Id.
110. Id. Somewhat oddly, the court did not address the district judge’s
indication that he would have actually given a lighter sentence if he had used the
time-of-crime Guidelines. See id.
111. 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
112. Id. at 1100.
113. Id. at 1095.
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114

provided a range of 33 to 41 months. The D.C. Circuit remanded
for resentencing, holding that the use of post-crime Guidelines
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the Guidelines, though
115
legally advisory, are de facto mandatory.
Specifically, Turner “conduct[ed] an ‘as applied’ constitutional
116
analysis.”
It found significant the fact that the district court
sentenced Mr. Turner at the low end of the (seemingly) applicable
117
The court concluded, on this basis alone, that had the
range.
judge used the time-of-crime Guidelines “it is likely that Turner’s
118
sentence would have been less than 33 months.”
This was then
re-phrased into a “substantial risk that Turner’s sentence was more
severe” than it otherwise might have been, “thus resulting in a
119
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” With that decision, Turner
120
created a “crisp and clear” circuit split.
IV. POST-CRIME GUIDELINES DO NOT IMPLICATE THE EX POST FACTO
CLAUSE
Demaree established the correct rule under both the Supreme
Court’s Booker and ex post facto jurisprudence. Indeed, additional
Supreme Court cases and empirical evidence not available at the
time of Demaree further strengthen its holding. This section
advances, in two subparts, the argument that the use of post-crime
Sentencing Guidelines does not violate the ex post facto prohibition.
Part A considers the formal prong of the Garner test, arguing that
Booker and subsequent cases have made application of the
Guidelines purely discretionary. Part B addresses the second
Garner prong, and argues that empirical evidence indicates that the
formal discretion granted in Booker is, in fact, used by sentencing

114. Id. at 1096.
115. Id. at 1099–1100.
116. Id. at 1100.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Douglas A. Berman, DC Circuit Produces Crisp Split on Ex Post Issues after
Booker (Finally!!), SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Dec. 5, 2008, 11:26 AM), http://sentencing
.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/12/dc-circuit-produces-crispsplit-on-ex-post-issues-after-booker-finally.html (“[T]hanks to a ruling today by the
DC Circuit in United States v. Turner, this fascinating issue is now the subject of a
crisp and clear circuit split.” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have
addressed this issue in dicta, but none have addressed the issue head-on as in
Demaree and Turner.
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courts.
A. Formal Analysis Demonstrates Discretion
The legal landscape of the Guidelines post-Booker has become
increasingly clear, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized the discretionary nature of the Guidelines in
increasingly strong terms. Booker called the Guidelines “effectively
121
advisory” ; Gall affirmed that non-Guidelines sentences were not
122
presumptively unreasonable ; Kimbrough held that sentencing
courts could vary from the Guidelines based on policy
123
disagreements; and Irizarry noted that, because of the advisory
nature of the Guidelines, “neither the Government nor the
defendant may place the same degree of reliance on the type of
124
‘expectancy’ [of a particular sentence].”
1.

Required Consultation Does Not Make Guidelines Mandatory

Despite the Court’s holdings and rhetoric, some argue that
because “sentencing courts remain obligated to calculate and
125
consider the appropriate guidelines range,” the Ex Post Facto
126
Clause continues to apply. This approach is mistaken for several
reasons. First, though sentencing judges are required to calculate a
Guidelines range, they are also required to consider several other
127
sentencing factors mentioned in § 3553(a). The sentence should
reflect these factors, with the Guidelines serving merely as a starting
point for consideration. Moreover, because district courts are not
permitted to presume the reasonableness of within-Guidelines
sentences, their analysis must necessarily go beyond the

121. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005).
122. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
123. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007).
124. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008). See also Gall, 552
U.S. at 51.
125. United States v. Restrepo-Suares, 516 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Ventura, 481 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dillon,
supra note 85. This argument, though phrased in legal terminology, implies that
the use of discretion is likely limited in practice. In that regard, it might be better
suited to analysis under Garner’s second prong, discussed infra part IV.B. The
argument is refuted here, however, because it relies on legal standards for its
premise. Regardless, the empirical demonstration provided infra Part IV.B
responds to any alleged lack of actual discretion.
127. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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128

Guidelines.
Second, assuming that mere consultation of the Guidelines is
sufficient to constitute an ex post facto violation leads to absurd
results. As Demaree noted, such an approach “would encompass a
change in even voluntary sentencing guidelines, for official
guidelines even if purely advisory are bound to influence judges’
129
sentencing decisions.”
For a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
to exist, a defendant must demonstrate a close nexus between the
matter causing the risk of an increased sentence and the judge’s
determination to increase the sentence. Otherwise, “any regulation
traceable to Congress that disadvantages a criminal defendant”
would be an ex post facto law, a result that would “unmoor[] the
constitutional prohibition . . . from both its purpose and the
circumstances in which statutes and regulations have heretofore
130
been deemed to be ex post facto laws.”
Merely noting that judges
are to consider the Guidelines, then, does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the Guidelines increase the likelihood of a
131
higher sentence in a manner that violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
2.

Review of Variances Does Not Make Guidelines Mandatory

The fact that appellate courts are required to consider the
extent
of
a
variance
from
the
Guidelines is likewise insufficient to demonstrate an ex post facto
violation.
Though the Supreme Court has indicated that
significant departures from the Guidelines require more significant
132
justifications by the sentencing court, it has rejected both the use
of “rigid mathematical formula[e]” to determine the
reasonableness of a non-Guidelines sentence and the requirement
that district courts must provide “extraordinary” justifications for

128. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
129. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2006).
130. Id.
131. See United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007)
(Jones, C.J., concurring) (“A logical corollary to Booker would seem to be that the
ex post facto clause does not apply if the sentence imposed by the court need not be
harsher under later guidelines than it would have been under the guidelines in
effect when the offense was committed.
Post-Booker, the guidelines are
informative, not mandatory. A purely advisory regulation does not present an ex
post facto problem solely because it is traceable to Congress and will possibly
disadvantage a defendant.”).
132. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46–47.
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133

substantial variances.
Requiring greater justification for greater
variances merely recognizes that appellate courts generally require
more information to judge the reasonableness of such sentences
and thus encourages the district courts to provide that information.
As the Supreme Court noted in Irizarry, “there is no longer a
limit . . . on the variances from Guidelines ranges that a District
Court may find justified under the sentencing factors set forth in [§
134
3553(a)].”
These decisions indicate that, at least for the formal
prong of the Garner inquiry, the Guidelines are not so rigid as to
significantly increase the risk of a longer sentence.
B. Empirical Evidence Demonstrates Discretion
The Garner Court’s second prong is based on actual practice
rather than legal rules. “When the rule does not by its own terms
show a significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by
evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the
agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive
application will result in a longer period of incarceration than
135
under the earlier rule.” Empirical data demonstrate not only that
discretion is prevalent in the federal system, but that its use has
136
consistently risen since Booker.

133. Id. at 47.
134. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008).
135. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000).
136. Dillon, supra note 85. Dillon, who argues that the Guidelines should still
be subject to ex post facto analysis, concedes that the post-Rita empirical evidence
“may mitigate the likelihood that the application of the presumption of
reasonableness to retroactively-applied Guidelines revisions will create a
substantial risk of increased punishment,” and further notes that, at the time of
publication, it was still “too early to tell whether the Court’s admonitions in Rita
will cause the lower courts to show less deference to the Guidelines than has thus
far been the case.” Id. at 1037, 1083–84. As discussed infra the statistics now
available demonstrate that Rita has indeed had the effect of increasing the
exercise of discretion. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
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The Data Show an Increasing Rate of Non-Guidelines Sentences

In 2006, immediately after Booker, courts sentenced 38.2% of
137
defendants outside the Guidelines, or 13.6%, if one excludes
138
In
government-sponsored below-range sentences (G-S B-R).
139
2007, the rate had risen to 39.1% (13.5% without G-S B-R). The
non-Guidelines rate continued to rise in 2008, with 40.5% of
140
sentences falling outside the Guidelines (14.9% without G-S B-R).
The most current data, reflecting sentences from October 1, 2009
through September 30, 2010, indicate that 45.4% of sentences
141
imposed were outside the Guidelines (19.7% without G-S B-R).
The Sentencing Commission has also compiled data reflecting
total post-Booker and post-Gall/Kimbrough cases. That data reflects
that 38.6% of all post-Booker sentences have been outside the
142
Guidelines, and, continuing the trend noted in the above data,
137. The Sentencing Commission data is rounded to the nearest tenth of a
percent, resulting in slight differences in totals depending on whether one
calculates outside-the-Guidelines sentences by adding all non-Guidelines
sentencing percentages or by subtracting within-Guidelines sentences from one
hundred. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006 tbl.1 (2007) (providing 38.2% of outside-the-Guidelines
sentences if adding and 38.3% if subtracting from one hundred).
138. Id. Government-sponsored below-range sentence refers to “[c]ases in
which a reason for the sentence indicated that the prosecution initiated,
proposed, or stipulated to a sentence outside of the guideline range, either
pursuant to a plea agreement or as part of a nonplea negotiation with the
defendant.” Id. at tbl.1, n.6. A majority of these sentences are pursuant to a §
5K1.1 Substantial Assistance Departure motion by the Government. Id. at tbl.1.
Because the sentencing judge is still free to set the sentence within, above, or
below that recommended by the parties, the total number of non-Guidelines
sentences best captures the degree of discretion exercised by judges and is the
primary number used in the analysis here. For a debate on the propriety of this
approach, compare Daniel M. Levy, Note, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto
Clause’s Lack of Control over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2661–62 (2009) (“[G]overnment-sponsored sentences
should not be in the data sample because it is impossible to say what the sentence
would have been if left solely to the judge’s discretion.”) with Dillon, supra note
85, at 1091 (focusing on government-sponsored below range sentences).
139. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2007 tbl.1 (2008).
140. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2008 tbl.1 (2009).
141. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2010 DATA tbl.1 (2010).
142. “Post-Booker means the period from the date of the United States
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (January 12,
2005) through December 9, 2007.”
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, POSTKIMBROUGH/GALL DATA REPORT app. A (2008) [hereinafter POST-GALL REPORT].
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post-Kimbrough/Gall cases
show an increase to 40.8%.
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit, home of the Turner opinion, has the
lowest rate of within-Guidelines sentences, with over half (52.0%)
of post-Booker sentences falling outside the Guidelines and 62.1% of
145
post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences outside the range.
Even
146
discounting government-sponsored below-range sentences,
nearly one in five (18.9%) post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences in the
147
These statistics
D.C. Circuit were outside the Guidelines.
demonstrate a large and growing independence from the
Guidelines and certainly do not indicate that the Guidelines
148
present a “significant risk of increased punishment.”
The Third Circuit, in the parole guidelines context,
considered whether any specific rate of compliance is necessary to
establish a de facto mandatory system. In Geraghty v. United States
143. “Post-Kimbrough/Gall means the period from the date of the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. [85] (2007) and
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. [38] (2007) (December 10, 2007) and afterward.” Id.
144. Id. at tbl.1.
The cases in this table described as Post-Kimbrough/Gall reflect the 61,898
cases sentenced subsequent to the date of Kimbrough v. United States and
Gall v. United States (December 10, 2007), through September 30, 2008
with court documentation cumulatively received, coded, and edited at
the U.S. Sentencing Commission by February 10, 2009. Of these, 1,581
cases were excluded because information was missing from the submitted
document that prevented the comparison of the sentence and the
guideline range. The cases in this table described as Post-Booker reflect
the 213,704 cases sentenced after the date of United States v. Booker
(January 12, 2005) through December 9, 2007. Of these, 8,102 cases
were excluded for the above reason.
Id. at tbl.1, n.1.
145. Id. at tbl.1-DC.
The cases in this table described as Post-Kimbrough/Gall reflect the 326
cases sentenced in the D.C. Circuit subsequent to the date of Kimbrough
v. United States and Gall v. United States (December 10, 2007), through
September 30, 2008 with court documentation cumulatively received,
coded, and edited at the U.S. Sentencing Commission by February 10,
2009. Of these, two cases were excluded because information was
missing from the submitted documents that prevented the comparison of
the sentence and the guideline range. The cases in this table described
as Post-Booker reflect the 1,379 cases sentenced in the D.C. Circuit after
the date of United States v. Booker (January 12, 2005) through December 9,
2007. Of these, 15 cases were excluded for the above reason.
Id. at tbl.1-DC, n.1.
146. See supra note 143.
147. POST-GALL REPORT, supra note 142, at tbl.1-DC. In the Seventh Circuit,
24.9% of nongovernment-sponsored, post-Kimbrough/Gall sentences were outside
the guidelines. Id. at tbl.1-7.
148. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 257 (2000).
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Parole Commission, for example, the court indicated that a nonguideline rate of 60% “might” indicate that “discretion is, in fact,
unfettered,” while a within-guideline rate of “88% to 94%” would
mean that “the ‘channel for discretion’ provided by the guidelines
149
is in actuality an unyielding conduit.”
In a later case, the court
engaged in extensive statistical analysis and found that 24.6% of
150
parole decisions fell outside of the parole guideline ranges. This,
the court held, was “strong evidence of ‘substantial flexibility’ in
151
the application of the parole guidelines.”
As Judge
Higginbotham’s concurrence noted, the court did not find a
particular “degree of adherence [that] would suffice to make the
guidelines ‘laws,’ though it is now apparent that 75.4% adherence
152
is not enough.” Using this standard, apparently the only attempt
at specific numerical analysis developed in the federal courts of
appeal, the post-Booker sentencing guidelines would qualify as
153
sufficiently flexible.
2.

Within-Guidelines Sentences Do Not Indicate a Lack of Discretion

In addition, there are broader problems with the assumption
that the available statistics indicate the existence of a de facto
mandatory system. Turner argued that the high rate of withinGuidelines sentencing indicates that Booker had only a “minor”
effect on sentencing and that this high rate of compliance will
continue because “[p]ractically speaking, applicable Sentencing
Guidelines provide a starting point or ‘anchor’ for judges and are
154
likely to influence the sentences judges impose.”
Given that the
Guidelines are designed to be somewhat reflective of actual

149. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm’n, 579 F.2d 238, 267 (3d Cir.
1978) (citation omitted).
150. United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1161, 1163 (3d Cir.
1985). This number was derived after excluding certain data. Id. at 1163. The
Parole Commission asserted that “79.9% to 86.5% of the parole decisions have
fallen within the guideline ranges” and that “the highest and lowest rates of
compliance by a single regional office are 90.7% and 76.7%.” Id. at 1161.
151. Id. at 1163.
152. Id. at 1165 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
153. Cf. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (“[T]he
statistical probabilities standing alone generate no constitutional protections; a
contrary conclusion would trivialize the Constitution.”).
154. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As noted
above, this assumption was the extent of Turner’s analysis of the empirical Garner
prong. See supra note 116.
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155

sentencing practice,
within-Guidelines sentences do not
necessarily indicate that judges are crafting sentences because of the
Guidelines. Indeed, a well-designed Guideline system should
mirror the actual sentences given in most cases. As the Court
recognized in Rita, because the Guidelines “seek to embody the §
3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice[,] . . . it is
fair to assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s
156
objectives.” It was precisely this congruence that led the Court to
accept within-Guidelines sentences as reasonable, for if both the
sentencing court and the Guidelines agree, it “significantly
157
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”
Moreover, the Turner analysis provides no bright line
separating when the Guidelines are followed often enough to be de
facto mandatory and when they are not. Does a 51% rate of withinGuidelines sentences constitute de facto reliance on the Guidelines,
thus raising ex post facto concerns? Does the calculus change at
49%? How often must these statistics be updated? Should they be
considered on a national basis, within a district, or judge-by-judge?
As Judge Higginbotham noted, courts have “not yet stated what
158
percentage of compliance transforms a guideline into a law.” If a
bright-line test were developed, however, “the assumption seems to
be [that] the district courts need only periodically check what the
current figure is to see whether the Parole Commission is acting as
159
a quasi-legislature.”

155. The Commission bases much of its work on actual practice. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“[The Guidelines are] the product of
careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of
thousands of individual sentencing decisions.”). The Commission also attempts to
incorporate Congressional directives. See id. at 46 n.2 (“Notably, not all of the
Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence. For example, the Sentencing
Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines
range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory
mandatory minimum sentences that Congress established for such crimes.”).
156. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007).
157. Id. at 347.
158. United States ex rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1166 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring) (citing Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n (Geraghty
I), 579 F.2d 238, 267 (3d Cir. 1978)).
159. Id. The Gall Court argued, albeit in a different context, that “the
mathematical approach assumes the existence of some ascertainable method of
assigning percentages to various justifications. . . . The formula is a classic example
of attempting to measure an inventory of apples by counting oranges.” Gall, 552
U.S. at 49.
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Furthermore, as Demaree noted, requiring time-of-crime
160
Because sentencing judges are
Guideline use would be futile.
free to consider factors external to the Guidelines (and indeed
161
must do so), a judge otherwise prohibited from applying the postcrime Guidelines “can always say not that he based his sentence on
[post-crime Guidelines], but that he took the advice implicit in it.
A judge is certainly entitled to take advice from the Sentencing
162
Commission.”
The Turner court dismissed this argument in one sentence,
asserting only that the court “reject[s] the idea that district judges
163
will misrepresent the true basis for their actions.” This misses the
point, however. The argument is not that judges will lie, obfuscate,
or hide their reasoning, but that they are permitted to consider the
Sentencing Commission’s judgments. If a judge believes the postcrime Guidelines more accurately capture the culpability of the
164
defendant, she may impose the sentence for reasons noted in the
Guidelines, without relying on the Guideline calculation per se.
Indeed, the First Circuit has held that “it was entirely appropriate
for the [district] court to consider what it viewed as the
congressional intent behind the sentencing guidelines in
165
evaluating the individual characteristics of this case.” “Although
the guidelines had a significant influence on the district court’s
sentencing decision, it plainly treated them as advisory. . . . There
166
is surely no error in that.”
The Turner court necessarily rejected
this argument out of hand, because its holding cannot otherwise
account for this problem.

160. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006).
161. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59 (“[T]he Guidelines are only one of the factors to
consider when imposing sentence, and § 3553(a)(3) directs the judge to consider
sentences other than imprisonment.”).
162. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795; see also United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440,
446 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[G]iven the continuing importance of the guidelines as a
means for bringing the policy decisions of the Sentencing Commission into the
sentencing process, the court’s measured deference to the policies behind the
guideline recommendations for Gilman’s economic crimes was entirely
appropriate.”).
163. United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
164. Updated Guidelines should often better address culpability than older
editions, as they are often updated specifically to better address the nuances of
criminal acts. See sources cited supra notes 17 and 162.
165. Gilman, 478 F.3d at 448.
166. Id. at 446.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite legal and empirical arguments, the use of post-crime
Guidelines might still strike some observers as unfair, because
defendants could not have known that the applicable Guideline
range at sentencing would be higher than it was when they
committed their crime.
The nonmandatory nature of the
Guidelines addresses this concern, however. While a judge must
consider the Guidelines range, including the newly heightened
section applicable to the defendant, she is also able to consider the
defendant’s argument regarding timing and lack of notice. To the
extent the judge believes imposition of the higher sentence is
inappropriate, unwarranted, or unfair, she can impose a lighter
167
sentence.
Moreover, because judges are only constrained by the statutory
minima and maxima (as was true pre-Guidelines), defendants have
no reason to expect any particular sentence within that range. As
Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence in Garner, “[d]iscretion to
be compassionate or harsh is inherent in the sentencing scheme,
and being denied compassion is one of the risks that the offender
168
knowingly assumes.” Any variation from an expected sentence “is
merely part of the uncertainty which [is] inherent in [a]
discretionary . . . system, and to which [a defendant] subjected
169
himself when he committed his crime.”
The Ex Post Facto Clause has a specific and defined role, one
that no longer applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. Garner
establishes a clear two-part test that puts the onus on the defendant
to demonstrate harm caused by a retroactive rule. On the formal
level, the Court has re-emphasized, in increasingly strong language,
170
the advisory nature of the Guidelines.
Empirically, the data
demonstrate that sentencing judges have taken this language to
167. See, e.g., United States v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2006) (“In
assessing the reasonableness of Larrabee’s sentence, we also find persuasive the
amendments to the sentencing guidelines which became effective on November 1,
2004, subsequent to the date of Larrabee’s offense. . . . Here we do not apply the
amended guidelines, but reference them because they are instructive as to the
range of reasonableness.”); see also United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316,
322 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[The defendants’] success, however, may only be fleeting
because, when resentenced under the now advisory guidelines regime, the new
sentences can conceivably be the same as those vacated today.”).
168. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 258 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 259.
170. See supra Part IV.A.
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heart and are treating the Guidelines in the advisory role Booker
171
A defendant’s sentence, therefore, is not due to the
envisioned.
strictures of the Guidelines, but to his own conduct and the district
judge’s sense of reasonableness. Because the Guidelines merely
inform—rather than bind—the judicial exercise of discretion, the
use of post-crime Guidelines does not violate the Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause.

171.

See supra Part IV.B.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/12

26

